Rabu, 18 Maret 2009

India's quest for security in Indian Ocean: Implication for Indonesia

INDIA’S QUEST FOR MARITIME SECURITY – IMPLICATION FOR INDONESIA
(A Thesis Submitted in partial fulfillmnet ofthe requirement for award of Master of Phillisopy Degree on Defence and Strategic Studies at the National Defence College, New Delhi, affiliated to the University of Madras)
By Colonel I Wayan Midhio

INTRODUCTION

1. The oceans have played a major part in the shaping of this planet and its civilization evolution. With the continuous rise in the world's population, there has been an associated rise in living standards in almost all societies. This has led to a simultaneous rise in the demand for raw materials generated by industrial and post-industrial technology, creating growing pressure on natural resources of all types and kinds. As resources become increasingly scarce, man's attention is turning to the oceans for further development, and very survival. The year 1998 was, therefore, declared the International Year of the Ocean by the UN, to focus the attention of the world on the vast water bodies that surround us. It did manage to highlight, and bring into general focus, the extreme importance of the oceanic domain in the daily lives of common people, be it for carriage of commerce, energy or for dependence on living or mineral resources.
2. The Indian Ocean (IO) is covering an area of 28,400,000 square miles or 73,600,000 sq. km, constitutes about one seventh of earth and the world’s third largest water body.[1] It touches Asia in the North, Australia to the East, Antarctica to the South and Africa to the West. Its southern boundary is an arbitrary line drawn from Cape Agulhas on the southern tip of South Africa to South Tasmania in South-East Australia. The IO forms two large indentations in the Southern coast of Asia, the Arabian Sea in the West and the Bay of Bengal in the East. At present, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) hosts heavy international maritime traffic that includes half of the world’s containerized cargo, one third of its bulk cargo and two third of its oil shipment. Its waters carry heavy traffic of petroleum and petroleum products from the oilfields of Persian Gulf and Indonesia and contain an estimated 40% of world’s offshore production. In addition to the bordering countries, fishing fleets from Japan, Russia, South Korea and Taiwan make a rich harvest of the region. The region contains beach sands rich in heavy minerals and offshore oil and gas deposits are actively exploited by bordering countries, particularly India, South Africa, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

3. India has substantial geo-strategic interests in the IO. It is in India's interest that the presence of extra-regional forces is minimized, to enable littoral countries to pursue their developmental programs in a co­operative regional framework. As the largest country in the region, India has a responsibility to extend support to friendly countries, so that they do not have to seek the aid of extra-regional powers. To safeguard India's maritime interests and build further on the geo-strategic potential in this ocean, India would need to develop into the major maritime power in the region. Modem history shows, that the development of sea power depends less on past traditions and more on the determination of a nation.

4. Indonesia is the largest archipelagos in the world. The position of Indonesia archipelago forms a crossroad between two oceans, the Pacific and the IO and a bridge between two continents, Asia and Australia. The Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, Ombai-Wetar and Torres on her territories, besides Babel Mandeb and Hormuz are the most important chokepoints on the SLOCs. The route is critical for Russia, China, Japan, Europe and the US as it has manifested quite unambiguously during the Gulf War in 1991, in Afghanistan post September 11 and the ongoing war in Iraq. China too, has stepped up her interest since 1992, with increased naval presence in the IO. Because of its strategic location, Indonesia’s cultural, socials, politics, economy and security patterns have always been conditioned by its geographical position. To safeguard Indonesia's maritime interests and her territory, Indonesia would need to develop not only strong armed forces but also develop strong diplomacy with the neighboring countries to ensure sovereignty of her territory.
5. Both of the countries, India and Indonesia have so many commonalities, but at the same time have so many differences. The commonalities are democracy, multiple cultures, ethnicities, religious, and languages. Both are IO littoral states, have the largest population in their sub-regions, and are members of NAM. Meanwhile the differences are India has the biggest Hindu population but Indonesia has the biggest Muslim population. India is a sub-continent country but Indonesia is an archipelago. The significant differences between both of the countries are the outlook of the countries to safeguard each national interest. In this case, the India chose to develop the strong maritime power and control the IO for economic growth achievement. Meanwhile, Indonesia developed her maritime power to protect the sovereignty of her territory and creates a good relationship to the neighboring countries as the basis of her security policies. Base on those differences, this paper try to give solutions how both of the countries walk together to safeguard the national interests, without rise any conflicts. And also, both countries ought to maintain good relations and share togetherness in all fields.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

Before Colonialism Era

6. Indian Dominance. Based on the history in the past, the IO has been very important for the human being in the region. For along time before Columbus sailed across the Atlantic Ocean, India had complete control and dominance over the IO, which has been a highway for commercial and cultural traffic between the Mediterranean Sea and the South China Sea. Evidence exists about active India navigation in the Bay of Bengal as early as the fourth century, when shipping services were operating between India eastern coast port and countries of Southeast Asia. The Andhra Dynasty, which followed the Mauryas, colonized parts of Sumatra, Java, Annam (Now Vietnam) and some island in the Pacific in the first century AD and maintained maritime supremacy I the region of their operation (Bay of Bengal), up to sixth century. The Indians had freedom of navigation in the Arabian Sea also.[2] See Figure 1.

7. Indonesian Dominance. The Sriwijaya Empire based in South Sumatra (Palembang, Indonesia), held command over Malacca Strait. An inscription of the 9th century found in Nalanda, India, reveals the good relationship between the King of Bengal and the King of Sriwijaya, the rule of the Strait of Malacca and the southern part ot the South China Sea.[3] See Figure 2. It controlled the maritime traffic through the Malacca and Sunda Straits including its ports of Kedah, Ligor, and Tumasik (Singapore) and effectively curbed China’s trade, thereby preventing them from dominating Southeast Asia.[4] The Majapahit was the last great Hindu Kingdom of Southeast Asia.[5] Based in East Java was the biggest and most powerful Hindu Kingdom in Indonesia that controlled the Malacca and Sunda Straits, Anam (Vietnam), Champa (Kampuchea), Tumasik (Singapore), Kedah, Malay, South Philippine and all of the islands in Indonesia from the 12th to the 15th century.[6] See Figure 3.

The Sriwijaya Empire

Source: http://www.wikipedia.com/. Srivijaya.org [[ accessed on 17 May 2008]
Figure 2

The Majapahit Empire (1293 – 1527)

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majapahit [[accessed on 2 June 2008]
Figure 3

8. In the 1007 the Chola Emperor, Rajendra fitted out a powerful navy and challenged the might of the Sriwijaya Empires.[7] This naval rivalry lasted for nearly 100 years.[8] Weakening of both the powers and fall of the Majapahit Empires enabled the Arabs and the Chinese to trade with each other and so commenced the Arab influence in the IO. See Figure 4.

The Arabs and Chinese Trade (500-1000) in the IO
Source:http://www.wikipedia.com./free map/sea floor//[[accessed on 2 June 2008]
Figure 4
During Colonialism Era
9. Portuguese Dominance. The presence of the Portuguese in the IO marked by the Treaty of Tordesillas signed by Spain and Portuguese in 1494 divided the world ocean between the two maritime powers, so the IO become part of the Portuguese area influence.[9] India’s maritime supremacy came to an end in 1503, when the Portuguese gained a decisive victory at Cochin. After overpowering Diu in 1509, Portuguese gained supremacy in the IO. Alfonse Albuquerque occupied Socotra in 1507 and Hormuz in 1510, securing access to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. He conquered Goa in 1510 and Malacca in 1513 and so, within a span of 15 years after reaching India, Portuguese were in control of practically the whole of the IO. The importance of control of the sea, stood out starkly, as India lost her independence, only when she lost the command of the sea.[10]

10. Dutch Dominance. The Dutch, the French and the English followed the Portuguese into the IO. It was not possible for any nation other than the Portuguese to sail into the Indian seas from the Atlantic side, till the overwhelming might of the Portuguese and Spain, which had a common King, suffered a heavy blow on account of break-up of the Armada and aggressive piracy of Drake and the English captains. The Dutch were the first to take advantage of the changed situation. Initially, they consolidated their position in Java, by establishing their base at Batavia (now Jakarta). In 1641 they seized Malacca and made an entry in the IO. Realizing the importance of Ceylon, Dutch occupied Colombo on May 1654 and India’s Malabar Coast, fell to the Dutch in 1663 whereby the Dutch established a firm base in Cochin, along with smaller settlements.[11]

11. French Dominance. The French appeared at the Malabar Coast (India) as early as 1527 but it was only in 1601, that regular trade commenced with India. With eclipsing of the Portuguese maritime power in the IO, betweens 1660 to 1670 and elimination of prime position of the Dutch in the Atlantic Ocean, France began her imperial policy towards the east, by capturing Reunion Island in 1721 and occupying Mauritius within a few years. Appreciating the importance of Trincomalee (Sri Lanka), they captured it on 31 August 1782. During the French revolution, the French lost the captured bases in the IO to the English. Left with no hold in the ocean, they occupied Madagascar, a base of great natural strength, which enabled them to maintain control over the main sea routes of the India Ocean.[12]

12. British Dominance. Open hostilities started between the French and the British in 1745, leading to naval battles. During the Napoleonic wars, the British conquered some ports in Sumatra and Java. The British Navy gained naval supremacy by defeating the French Armada in 1783 and captured Malacca in 1786. Defeating the French fleet in 1805, the British became the sole naval power in the world in the 19th century. By 1815, they seized the greater part of the region namely Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, India, Sri Lanka and part of Malaysia and later Australia. They reached Persian Gulf area in 1820, Singapore in 1824 and Aden in 1839, to exercise complete domination over the Ocean.[13] British held sway over the IO by occupying strategically important littoral countries to exercise complete control over the entry points from the East and the West.[14] See Figure 12. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 was an historic event as it drastically reduced the distance from Black Sea ports to the IO. The control over Suez Canal further strengthened British hold over the IO. Decolonizing commenced after the WW II, which radically changed the situation in the IOR. The British withdrew from the Suez Canal in 1956, but continued make use of their bases in Aden and Singapore for consolidating their hold in South-East Asia and East Africa. Asia continued to remain an area of vital interest to Britain.[15]

During Cold War
13. British. During WW II Britain was able to retain a chain of bases stretching from the Suez in the West to Singapore in the East and from Aden and Bahrain in the north to Simons Town in the south. Even Britain was the mistress of the IO which was considered to be a British Lake during colonialism era. Australia and South Africa, as members of the British Commonwealth, buttressed both the southern flanks of the IO. Thus, Britain had bases and facilities in all the strategically important points in the IOR. It could and did project force from there during several cases of fire fighting exercises whenever needed. If deemed necessary, forces from Britain could also be inducted. In fact, Britain had already in place the forerunner of the RDF/CENTCOM strategy that was presented with great fanfare by United States of America (USA) in late seventies and eighties. Britain lost its strategic base in the Suez Canal, which was available under the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954, after their misadventure during the Suez War of 1956. But they had retained bases on the littoral of the IO as in Bahrain, Aden, Zanzibar, Simons Town and Singapore. These bases enabled Britain to intervene on several occasions in the IOR. Most of these interventions were on invitation by the ruling elite. All these developments during 1960s showed a deep involvement of Britain, almost on its own, in the politics of the IOR. However, by 1967 to 1968, Britain had decided to withdraw from the region and under the East of Suez policy the withdrawal was to be completed by 1971.[16]

14. French. UK the traditional great power in the IO, had virtually handed over its role to USA in 1972. A new great power, USSR, had made its naval presence felt since 1968. Only one traditional power, French, had consistently retained its military presence in the region. Though a part of the West, the French presence was autonomous and not a part of an integrated Western naval strategy in the IO. Perhaps the French even then had their reservations on joining with USA even on issues like energy security and unified policy of protection of SLOCs. The French pursued their policies independent of that of USA. The main reasons motivated the French to pursue that policy and probably the most significant was the desire to retain the semblance of the great power status. France had a colonial empire and thus was an Indian Ocean power by inheritance. Though decolonization process had greatly eroded its colonial possessions but it had been able to retain its presence in areas of strategic significance. Their presence was significant for two main reasons; protection of SLOC and exploitation of the living and long-living resources of the sea under the provisions of UNCLOS III.[17]

15. Soviet Union. The geo-strategic importance of the IO for USSR, as also for the Czarist Russia, is often ignored by naval experts who deal with the question of security in the IO. USSR, and now Russia, is a vast land mass with widely separated coasts in the Pacific region in the east, and the Black Sea the Baltic and the North Sea in the west. In the absence of viable land routes across Siberia, sea routes were vital links between these coasts. The IO caries the major SLOCs which not only linked USSR with littoral states, but also is the only year­ round sea route linking the European part of the USSR with its Far Eastern ports. Though the IO was of vital strategic significance, USSR did not deploy its naval units there till 1968. To understand the Soviet naval deployment in the IO one needs to analyze two factors. The one is the major restructuring of the Soviet Navy as also the evolution of Soviet naval strategy, at least since early 1960s, under the inspiring leadership of Admiral Gorshkov. The other is the Soviet Union's responses to the increasing naval challenges to its security, as it perceived, from the Western powers, primarily from the USA.[18]

16. USA. American policy in the IO can be broadly analyzed under four phases which also represent a chronological continuity. The first phase, 1947 to 1965 was one of low profile since the IO was still considered as a British Lake. During the second phase of 1965 to 1974, USA began to assume the role of a 'regional' great power. This phase was marked by the British withdrawal, the entry of the Soviet Navy and the raising of the question of IO as a nuclear-weapon free zone. In the third phase, 1974 to 1979, the major concern was energy security of US mainland as also the challenges posed by OAPEC. The period after 1979 saw a direct involvement, following the Iranian revolution and the Afghan crisis, as represented by the Carter Doctrine. The Iraq-Iran war and the associated tanker war not only legitimized an increase in the naval presence of Western forces, including that of USA, but also helped to overcome the political resistance of the GCC states, especially of Saudi Arabia, that allowed USA to acquire major bases and base facilities in the GCC states in the context of the RDF/CENTCOM strategy.[19] Beside that, Diego Garcia base agreement was signed between UK and USA on 30 December 1966 under which the island was leased to USA for defense purposes for a period of fifty years,[20] and a provision for further extension for twenty years. This event was pointed out British policy withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. Together, USA had emerged as the hégémon power even before the end of the Cold War. See Figure 5.
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Maps of Diego Garcia

INDIAN OCEAN INDIAN OCEAN

Diego Garcia

Figure 5
Note:
1. Diego Garcia Island is the southernmost island and largest island of British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT): 60 sq km, 55 islands and Diego Garcia: 44 sq km, occupies strategic location in central Indian Ocean; island is site of joint US-UK military facility.
2. Total :54,400 sq km , land: 60 sq km; Diego Garcia 44 sq km , water: 54,340 sq km , note: includes the entire Chagos Archipelago of 55 islands.
3. Defense is the responsibility of the UK; the US lease on Diego Garcia expires in 2016. in November 2004, there were approximately 4,000 UK and US military personnel and civilian contractors living on the island of Diego Garcia.
4. Approximately 1,200 former agricultural workers resident in the Chagos Archipelago, often referred to as Chagossians or Ilois, were relocated to Mauritius and the Seychelles in the 1960s and 1970s; in November 2000 they were granted the right of return by a British High Court ruling, though no timetable has been set.
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INDIA’S POLICY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

India’s Foreign Policy
17. Global and regional politics underwent change in 1991 due to collapse of USSR resulting in the end of bipolar world system and emergence of China as a major power in Asia region. At the same time, India faced macroeconomic crisis, which led to policy of economic liberalization. For India, as a large country in the region, to catch up with ongoing process of globalization it was imperative to extend the domestic and regional economic space and Southeast Asia seemed to be most appropriate space for extending India's economic space.[21] India’s policy of ‘looking east’ took shape under Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao, Prime Minister (1991-1995), who initiated the paradigm shift in Indian foreign policy - known as the “Look East” policy launched in 1992. Simultaneously, Southeast Asian countries also feared in the early nineties that the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, a reduced US regional deployment due to its withdrawal from Philippines and China's growing influence might give rise to regional instability.
18. Southeast Asia states, perceived India as emerging region power and China as a source of security threat. They were convince about the need for a paradigm shift in Indai – ASEAN linkage because of the volatile situation in South China Sea due to conflicting claim over the Spratly islands, the atmosphere in the Taiwan straits and the Korean peninsula among the US,Japan and China. Thus, mutual needs affected their convergence and India's 'look east policy' coincided with ASEAN's 'look west' line, which led to normalization of relations between India and ASEAN.[22] With the formulation of the Look-East policy, India became a sectoral dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1992, a full dialogue partner in 1995 and a member of the ARF in 1996. For ASEAN, strategic reassurance was provided by India’s rapidly growing military and economic power, her huge markets and human resource base particularly in knowledge based industries.

India’s Nuclear Policy
19. The nuclear weapons were not merely political tools but very much a part of overall military strategy. The nuclear doctrine that India’s adopt will decide the nuclear strategy that in turn will decide the force structure and Command and Control systems. The nuclear philosophy of a nuclear weapon state is strongly influenced by bureaucratic and political forces. The political leadership along with scientists from DRDO has controlled India's nuclear strategy and weapons. This is perhaps one of the main reasons why India perceives nuclear weapons as "political weapons" geared more towards providing deterrence value rather than for actual use. The most debated yet the most responsible and logical content of the nuclear doctrine is the 'no first use' option. To understand the rationale behind this statement, one needs to answer the question: why do we need the nuclear weapons? The only rational answer to this is that we need them to deter another nuclear power state from using them against us. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.[23]

20. As long as India adopts NFU strategy, survivability of the nuclear arsenal would be the key to the efficacy of the creditable minimum deterrent. Various ways will have to be found out so that the adversary is not tempted to believe that first strike against India will seriously degrade her ability to retaliate. This would require minimum deterrence in the worst case. This capability, therefore, becomes a critical minimum national security imperative. The end point of minimum deterrence cannot be reached overnight. Even a very small arsenal has the potential to deter the possible used by another country with a much bigger arsenal.[24] The US was deterred by the prospect of a single weapon getting through to its major city at the time of Cuban missile crisis in 1962. China had less than a dozen nuclear weapons when it fought a conventional war with the Soviet Union in 1969. It would take about 15 to 20 years before India's nuclear posture and arsenal stabilize. To ensure credible deterrence, the delivery system has to be secured. To achieve this capability, India will have to depend on triad of land-based missiles, aircraft and sea-based nuclear deterrent. Of these, sea-based nuclear deterrent is likely to take time and would cost a lot. The aircraft are susceptible to interception by hostile systems; therefore, it becomes critical that the central component of the nuclear arsenal must rest on ballistic missiles.

India’s Maritime Policy
21. The regional security in the IOR has undergone a qualitative change with the end of the Cold War and that has directly impacted on Indian naval missions, procurement policy and maritime strategy. A careful examination of acquisitions since the early 1990s gives the impression that India feels relatively more secure with the scaling down of tensions that followed the earlier build-up by the superpowers. Limited defense cooperation between the navies of India and the US joint exercises, for instance, seems to have contributed to India's post-Cold War era maritime strategy. Nevertheless, India's basic concerns remain unchanged. India feels that Pakistan continues to pose a serious threat to its interests in the region, while China might attempt to undermine India's position in the IO. It is against the above backdrop that the Indian maritime strategy is examined.

22. According to a former Indian naval chief, "Maritime strategy is the total response of a nation to the oceans around it. Sea power is that part of the maritime strategy with which a nation attempts to achieve predetermined economic and political goals." As the Indian Navy expands, its maritime strategy is also becoming definitive in shape, though it is never articulated and remains disjointed in official explanations. As explained in the earlier chapters, the status of the Indian Navy has evolved from that of a brown-water navy with the orientation of coastline defense to that of a "sea going navy" in tandem with growing maritime interests into what has come to be known as "defense of the nation's maritime interests."[25] Because India occupies a unique position in this ocean, it has to plan its maritime strategy from three distinct angles, as well as the IO, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The current as well as potential threats from these three approaches are totally different in content and nature.

India’s Energy Security.
23. Twenty-first century global realities have altered the concept of national security. While national security is a holistic concept, energy security is one of its major components. The latter essentially involves ensuring uninterrupted supply of energy to support the economic and commercial activities necessary for sustained economic growth. As far as India is concerned, energy security emanates from the growing imbalance between the demand for energy and its supply from indigenous sources resulting in increased import dependence. Energy consumption is both a necessary condition for economic growth and a consequence of it.

24. Due to liberalization, the Indian economy has improved. Increase in economic growth and per capita income boost the economic activity and result in more energy-dependent lifestyles. The total primary energy demand increased from 1,716 MTOE in 1992 to 2,421 MTOE in 2000 to 2001. The demand for commercial energy increased from 199 MTOE in 1992 to 225 MTOE in 2000 to 2001. But the energy resources are limited and inadequate. India’s consumption of petroleum product was found to be increasing at the rate of 3.8 % per annum during 2002 to 2004. In 2003 to 2004, net of exports, India consumed 116.01 MT of crude oil products, including refinery fuel. At the same time, the domestic product of crude oil has remained between 30.3 and 33.86 MT. Not only has the domestic production stagnated, but oil reserves have been hovering between 700 and 750 MMT during the period. The total reserves were 739 MMT in 1990 to 1999 and were estimated to be 733 MMT in 2003 to 2004.[26] The proven natural gas reserve is 763 billion cubic meters. The production is 86 MMSCMD, while the demand is 115 MMSCMD. Based on the present GDP growth rate of 6 percents, the demand for crude oil will be 190 million tons by 2011 to 2012, which will result in 81 percents import dependence. With respect to natural gas, the demand will rise to 313 MMSCMD in 2010 to 2012.[27]

India’s Threat Perception.
25. Historically, till about the 16th century, almost all the invasions into India were land-based. Unlike the past invasions, the entry of the British and other European powers in the 16th century via the seas led to the colonization of the country. And, because of the wars India had to fight on various fronts since independence, it is believed that now India faces threats from the land as well as the sea. Another equally important factor that influenced India's threat perception was China's successful detonation of an atomic device in 1964. India, thus, was confronted with the additional problem of a nuclear threat from China and Pakistan. India suddenly found itself isolated, without many friends and surrounded by hostile powers threatening its unity and territorial integrity. New Delhi was obviously very disappointed by the indifferent attitude and insensitive policies of the West, especially the US. That was the beginning of the drift in India-US relations, and the two could never come to terms with each other after that, despite best efforts.

26. Apart from renewed arms supplies to Pakistan by the US and China, China's security relationship with Pakistan was further cemented.[28] China also started supplying arms to India's other neighbors, which New Delhi surmised was a deliberate attempt to undermine Indian interests. That led to the feeling that India was encircled by a hostile atmosphere on all sides. India's intervention in Sri Lanka to eliminate external involvement in that country was in part prompted by that fear.[29] Though global security has since undergone immense change, from an Indian perspective, the impact of the Cold War has not been as colossal as it has been for many other parts of the world. Thus, India's future threat perception continues to be governed by major extra-regional power relationships involving Pakistan and China.[30]
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SECURITY TRENDS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION –
SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION

Global and Regional Security Initiative

27. Asian Regional Forum. This forum established by ASEAN in 1994 for open dialogue and consultation on regional political and security issues, to discuss and reconcile the differing views between ARF participants in order to reduce risk to security. In this regard, ASEAN undertakes the obligation to be the primary driving force. It is the only forum at the government level attended by all major powers in the Asia Pacific such as US, China, Japan, Russia, and EU. The ARF recognizes that the concept of comprehensive security includes not only military aspects but also political, economic, social and other issues. As a major venue for carrying out ASEAN’s objectives of regional harmony and stability, ARF adopted two main objectives: First, to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern and, Second, to contribute to efforts towards confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region[31].
28. At the Twenty-seventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1994, the Foreign Ministers agreed: “ARF could become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region. In this context, ASEAN should work with its ARF partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the Asia Pacific.” Although ARF is relatively new, it has become an invaluable contributor to the maintenance of harmony and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Its work is complemented by a non-official “Track Two” process led by non-government institutes.[32]

29. The Other Securities Initiative. Post incident ‘nine eleven” the IMO instituted the first-ever global security arrangements. These include the ISPS code, PSC and technology-related means like VHF-range AIS and satellite-based LRIT for ships on passage. There is also a drive to phase out single-hull tankers to prevent marine pollution through oil spills. The US resorted to more stringent homeland security measures with its trading partners such as the CSI and the Sea Marshals. While it may be desirable for states to comply with these measures, these measures cannot comprehensively ensure maritime security. Moreover, most littorals are inadequately ‘armed’ to combat maritime crimes due to shortage of trained personnel and equipment, obsolescence or inadequacy of national legislations and weak law enforcement mechanism. Despite IMO’s ITCP, adoption of these measures may not be financially sustainable. The investment involved is high and many states perceive it as a diversion of funds essential for development work.

30. Regional cooperation. Regionalism is essential today, based on each state’s dependence on the other and optimum utilisation of their resources and capacities. States need to pool their assets, efforts and intelligence to deter security threats through regional cooperation -a mix of regulations, inspections, technology and deterrence and complementing global arrangements in a comprehensive layered defence. Currently, non-state threats to sea-lines in the eastern IO pose the principal challenge. It is imperative for India to engage Bay of Bengal/Andaman Sea littorals in a calibrated manner, such that its proactive stance is not construed as a local sheriff’s role ‘guided’ by the US. India’s existing arrangement for joint patrols with Indonesia has been extended bilaterally to Thailand in 2005 and could also be extended to Myanmar. Subsequently, an agreement may also be evolved as an up-gradation of the economic agenda of BIMST-EC pivoted on the following; firstly, Joint-SLOC patrols to counter maritime-terrorism, piracy, poaching, drug trafficking and gunrunning. Secondly, Formation of SLOCs in member-states for coordination of SLOC patrols and regional ship-plot/information exchange. Thirdly, Joint-maritime exercises to achieve inter-operability in terms of communication, equipment operating procedures and RoEs. Lastly, Quick-response Joint Task Force for crises management and environmental protection including SAR. The arrangement may be widened later to the Malacca and the Singapore Straits, if so desired by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Threats may grow in the future, both in their reach and ferocity. If so, it may require India to extend its role in the western IO too through joint SLOC patrols.

UNCLOS Regime in the Indian Ocean Region
31. The oceans have long been subject to the "Freedom of the Seas" doctrine. However, history of the law of the sea is a narration of the struggles for and against the doctrine of the freedom of the seas. As Professor Verzijl states, "Historical research clearly proves, that freedom has no static content 'a priori', but is subject to continuous, at times even violent changes". Interestingly, it was not until the end of the WW II in 1945 that the oceans began to witness a multitude of claims, counter claims and sovereignty disputes. By the late 1960s, technological advances had led to a shift in the economic potential of oceans from the traditional use for navigation and fishing to exploitation of resources - from oil to tin, diamonds to gravel and metals to medicinal drugs.

32. It was the UNCLOS-III in 1982 that consolidated all past treaties, codified customary law and put in place new law for new issues. In one stroke, law of the sea evolved into hard law from soft law. UNCLOS III codified the oceans as the "Common Heritage of Mankind," to be managed responsibly and equitably for the benefit of all humanity. It was a global agreement. For the first time rights of land-locked states in maritime affairs were also addressed. UNCLOS III has provided for the change in emphasis from 'Freedom of the Seas' to 'Control and Regulation'. It can be said that due to the ever increasing demands and abuses of the oceans, the international community was obliged to ensure the effective exercise of freedom by controlling and regulating it even more closely.

Presence of the Major Powers
33. US Allies presence. The strategic environment in IOR has been reconfigured since the end of the Cold War, more so after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has removed the Soviet fleet from the IO. The region has now become a NATO lake dominated by US-led coalition from among NATO members and its non-NATO allies like Australia, Japan, South Korea, etc. The presence of the US military force as well as zone operation of the USCENTCOM in the northwest (Middle-east), USEUCOM in Southwest (Europe and Africa) and USPACOM in the northeast and southeast (Asia Pacific) had changed the strategic environment in the IOR. See Figure 6.

34. Multi-polar World. During the “tanker war” phase of the Iran-Iraq war, warships of NATO members offered protection to their flag vessels only. Even

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Combatant_Command [[accessed on 23 July 2008]
Figure 6

in Kuwaiti crisis in 1990-1991, the operation of NATO members was under auspices of UN. The end of the Cold War, the defeat of Iraq and the dismantling of apartheid saw a reduction in the clash of ideas and ideologies and a change from a bi-polar to a unipolar world. It also led to the strengthening of international monitoring and the growth of a capitalist security system where economic, social and environmental forces altered the security parameters that were applied for nearly four decades. The management of change thus became the major international challenge, with allies and adversaries changing places.[33] These pictures showed the presence of NATO force in the IOR, they were not operating as a single cohesive force of the NATO. But, when NATO led by US involved in Afghanistan war and followed by events of September 11th, 2001 legitimated their presence under the slogan of war on terror, as is evident from its presence in Afghanistan, Iraq and in various choke points under RMSI. The coalition of NATO members is also joined by some non-NATO allies like Australia, Japan, South Korea and also Pakistan. As the Annual Report, 2005-2006 of the Ministry of Defense put it, “Progress towards a truly multi-polar world, with India as one of the poles, has been slow but steady”.[34] This concept is totally at variance with the traditional concept of non-alignment that India was pursuing till recently.

Potential Threats in IOR
35. The IO and its contiguous waters present a plethora of security issues. Given its centrality, the emerging multi-polar influences will continue to converge and will be further catalysed by the strategic sea-lines and the significance of West Asia, a sub-region that remains volatile and unstable. Besides, the IO is located at the crossroads of terrorism originating from ‘two banks’ to its west and east that are hotbeds of Islamic fundamentalism, thus making it a de-facto ‘lake of jihads terrorism’. The region has hardly any security bonding. The GCC is barely effective in an unstable region without the inclusion of relevant powers like Iran and Israel. The IOR-ARC and SAARC are confined to economic and social issues. The convergence of security issues can be ruled out due to the unwieldy nature of the former and the Indo-Pak discord in case of the latter.

36. The threats to freedom of navigation in the IO may be broadly divided into three categories (See Figure 7), as follows: -
(a) Inter-State Conflicts. The first category is a classical inter-state maritime conflict, possibly due to sub-regional instabilities in the future. This can be initiated by a seemingly benign show of maritime might for assertion of sovereignty, such as Indonesia’s closure of the Sunda and Lombok Straits in 1996 to demonstrate a resolve to enforce interpretation of its archipelagic status.[35] Though the UNCLOS extended the jurisdiction of states over adjoining maritime zones, it fuelled confrontations among neighbours over claim to resources. Moreover, despite efforts to make it comprehensive, it enfolds ambiguities, the varied interpretations of which are potential sources of conflict. Sea mining is the most inexpensive form of maritime warfare and can cripple sea-borne trade particularly at vital choke points. Of course, the economic stakes involved today necessitate security of the SLOCs for trade flow and make a full-scale maritime conflict unlikely in the near future. However, the same cannot be asserted for the long term, when the demand for resources may revive such conflicts.
(b) Non-state actors. The second category encompasses non-conventional threats. Lately, a high degree of threat is being predicted from maritime terrorism to sea lanes and ports enclosed within the Hormuz and the Southeast Asian straits.[36] Insurgencies and terrorist activities with maritime traditions abound in the latter sub-region, viz, the MILF and the Abu Say’yaf. Given the established links of these regional groups with global terror groups, like JI and al-Qaeda, security concerns for the IO littorals will be high. While the LTTE’s activities equally pose a threat to littorals as far away as in Southeast Asia, given the Sri Lankan separatist group’s claims that the Sea Tigers be recognised as a ‘navy’ in the region. The LTTE is known to indulge in piracy for its funding and material assets and hence, cannot claim insurgent/belligerent rights under international law, nor the status of a navy for the ‘Sea Tigers’.[37]
(c) Natural Causes. The third category of threats is attributable to natural causes, inclusive of collisions and accidents due to inclement weather or human errors. In addition to blocking the sea lanes, particularly at choke points, it causes environmental pollution. There are more than 150 collisions at sea on a yearly basis due to poor visibility, non-serviceability of radars, hull failure, boiler explosions and human errors.[38] The natural perils of ocean transportation such as cyclones are common in the eastern IO and adjoining seas. The possibility of a catastrophic oil spill, such as the one from the Tasman Spirit in August 2003 off the coast of Karachi, will be of major concern if it was to happen in one of the choke points of the IO. Though not constituting threats to sea lanes per se, other perils add up to the IO’s inventory of maritime insecurities. The narcotics trade criss-crosses from the ‘Golden Crescent’ involving Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, and the Golden Triangle including Myanmar, Thailand and Laos. Drug trafficking leads to money laundering and funds from the sale of drugs are used to fuel gunrunning, insurgent and terrorist activities. Added to these is the trans-national security concern linked to human smuggling that has multiple effects, ranging from fuelling terrorism to illegal immigration causing socio-political instability. See Figure 7.
Plash Point and Shipping Lines in the IOR
(December 2004)


Alternative Routes
Important Straits

(Alternative Routes)

Source: http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/indian_ocean/index.htm [[accessed on 11 July 2008

Figure 7

Note:
1. There are no conflicts any more in Sumatera since the 2005, when Indonesian Government success signed Peace MoU with Free Aceh Movement. Even there is never any conflict in Java that mention in the map.
2. The alternative Route such as the Strait of Sunda, Lombok, Ombai-Wetar and Torres most of in Indonesia water territories.

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THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Geo-politic and Geo-strategic of the IOR
37. The IO is of utmost strategic importance in world affairs. Three of the six most important straits - Babel Mandeb, Dover, Dardanelles, Gibraltar, Hormuz and Malacca, on which the world's shipping concentrates, link the IO to the other oceans. Babel Mandeb and Hormuz are major oil transit chokepoints with no alternative routes. The only viable alternative via Lombok to the Malacca adds nearly 1200 nm to a voyage from the Persian Gulf to Japan. See Table 1. The IO extends only over one fifth of the world's total ocean surface and the shortest of coastline, which are the Pacific Ocean with a coastline of 135,663 km[39] is the largest ocean followed by the Atlantic Ocean with a coastline of 111,886 km,[40] and the IO with a coastline of 66,526 km.[41] The US Department of Energy anticipates that world demand for oil will grow by 1995 and 2015, with most of the increase being met by Persian Gulf nations.[42] Most of this oil will be flowing to the Far East through chokepoints. See Table 2.

38. Its strategic waterways account for transportation of highest tonnage of goods globally ­half the world's crude oil, container shipments and a third of the bulk cargo. The IO area comprises 32 littoral states, including five island states and 13 other island territories and 22 landlocked countries. See Table-3. According to the UN classification, countries which have access to the IO only via a coastal state bordering the IO and whose security is affected by development in those states form the Indian Ocean Region. By this definition, including the five Central Asian States of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan amongst the landlocked states - whose maritime access lies either to the Baltic Sea or the Black Sea through the Caspian Sea or to the Indian Ocean, through Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan - there are 54 countries and 13 other island territories in the IOR. The 54 countries represent over one third of the world's population; they account for two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves, a third of its natural gas, 90 per cent of its diamonds, 60 per cent of its uranium and 40 per cent of its gold. It is not surprising, therefore, for Fernand Braude to have observed that the IO was a "Weltwrtschaf" or "World Economy" with India at the centre. See Table 3.
39. The region contains one third of the world’s population, 25 percent of its landmass, 40 percent world’s oil and gas reserves. It is the locus of important international SLOCs. The region is home to most of the world's Muslim population as well as India, one of the world's likely "rising powers." The Indian Ocean also is home to the world’s two newest nuclear weapons states, India and Pakistan, as well as Iran, which most observers believe has a robust program to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, the region constitutes one of the key centers of gravity of international terrorism "the broad incubator of terrorism" in the words of one conference participant. While India and some a few of the other littoral states appear to be on a path of sustained economic progress, most of the region is characterized by high levels of poverty. The IOR suffers from a high level of international and internal conflict and is a key venue for international piracy. It also is the locus of some 70% of the world’s natural disasters.

Table 1 : World Vital Chokepoints

Eastern
Mediterranean and Eastern Pacific Europe Africa The American
Persian Gulf
___________________________________________________________________________
Bosporus Strait of Malacca Great Belt Mozambique Panama Canal
Dardanelles Sunday Strait Kiel Canal Channel
Suez Canal Lombok Strait Dover Strait Florida Straits
Strait of Hormuz Luzon Strait Strait of Gibraltar Yucatan Channel
Bab-el Mandeb Singapore Strait Windward Passage
Makassar Strait Mona Passage
Karimata Strait
Wetar - Ombai Straits
Torres Strait
Source: Globalization and Marine Power, edited by Sam J. Tangredi
Table 2 : Resource Scarcity Summary: Increased Demand


SLOC/Chokepoint Importance to the US Demand

Turkish Strait Black Sea and Caspian Sea Oil 1996: 123 ships/day
1997: 137 ships/day
___________________________________________________________________________
Strait of Malacca Asian/Oil Trade 2000: 200+ Ships/day
___________________________________________________________________________
Sunda Strait Asian/Oil Trade 3,500/year
___________________________________________________________________________
Lombok / Makassar Strait Asian/Oil Trade 3,900/year
___________________________________________________________________________
Singapore Strait Asian/Oil Trade 1997: 200 ships/day
___________________________________________________________________________
Strait of Hormuz Global Oil Trade 1997: 60 ships/day
___________________________________________________________________________
Panama Canal US East Coast-Asia, West Coast- 1997: 37 ships/day
Europe Trade 2010: 44 ships/day
2050: 55 ships/day
Source: Globalization and Marine Power, edited by Sam J. Tangredi

Sea Lanes of Communication
40. Indian Ocean SLOCs. The IO is home to important SLOCs and maritime choke points. A large volume of international long haul maritime cargo from the Persian Gulf, Africa and Europe transits through this ocean. This sea-borne trade, primarily oil, virtually affects every aspect of the daily lives of most people of the world. Similarly, the Southeast Asian choke points of the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits affect the economic vitality of the Asia-Pacific region. Measured by the sheer volume of merchant traffic transiting, these straits in 1993, almost half of the world's merchant fleet capacity and one-third of the world's ships sailed through these choke points.[43] See Table 2. Shipping traffic through the Malacca Strait is several times greater than the traffic either through the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal. The shipping lane transiting the IO and entering the strategic choke point of Southeast Asia has great geostrategic importance to the US, China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the Southeast Asian countries. Given these conditions, the northern IO is booming with maritime activity, and both economic and security interests impact in a concentrated form.

41. Indonesian SLOCs. International sea lanes through Southeast Asia are important to the economic and politic well being of billions of people throughout the world. The commercial and strategic significance of the Southeast Asia Sea requires little elaboration. The sea is a major source of food for the region, and the sea lanes are the lifeline of East Asian economies heavily dependent on unimpeded access to raw materials and market and investment opportunities throughout the region. Moreover, despite the end of the cold war, the strategic importance of many international straits in the region for global powers continues to be regarded as vital, because of the link they provide between naval deployments in the different regional or sub-regional seas.

42. Indonesia as the largest archipelago in the world forms a crossroad between two oceans, the Pacific and Indian oceans and a bridge two continents, Asia and Australia. This strategic position has five important chokepoints in the region, namely Malacca Straits, Sunda Straits, the Straits of Lombok and Makassar, Ombai-Wetar Straits, and Torres Straits.[44] Firstly, the Strait of Malacca. This strait is the main passage between the IO and the South China Sea. It is 600 miles long and 300 miles wide on its western side. Heading east, it narrows considerably into the Phillip channel and the Strait of Singapore. It is relatively shallow, with some points just 72 feet deep. The length of the Singapore Strait, which connects Malacca with the South China Sea, is 75 miles, with an overall width of less than 12 miles.[45] See Figure 19. In the 2004 more than 93,000 ships used this strait. See Table 4. Secondly, the Strait of Sunda is another alternative to Malacca between Java Island and Sumatra Island of Indonesia. Because the currents are strong and the depth of water is limited, deep draft ships do not use the strait. In the north, it is particularly shallow and dangerous, and therefore it is not heavily used. From Sunda Strait through Karimata Strait to South China Sea was the First of Indonesian SLOC.[46] See Figure 8, 9 and 20. Thirdly, the Lombok Strait is wider and deeper strait between Bali Island and Lombok Island of Indonesia. It is less congested than the Strait of Malacca and quite often is used as an alternative passage. It is sometimes used for the largest tankers transiting between the Persian Gulf and Japan, and it is considered the safest route. From Lombok Strait through Makassar Strait to Celebes Sea was the second Indonesia SLOC.[47] See Figure 8, 9 and 21. Fourthly, the Ombai-Wetar Straits is another alternative to the Pacific Ocean from the IO through Banda and Seram seas of the east side of Indonesia. Because of uneconomic of these straits not so many ships use the straits. These straits are the third Indonesia SLOC.[48] See Figure 8, 9 and 22. Fifthly, the Torres Strait is located between Indonesia and Australia territories and connected the IO and the Pacific Ocean, and because of the uneconomic of this strait not so many ships use the strait.[49] See Figure 14 and 23.

The Indonesia’s International Sea Lanes

Source: http://www.sukarno-years.net/hartono/400data.htm [[accessed on 27 May 2008]

Figure 8


Table 4 : Number and Tonnage of Vessel Using the Malacca Strait by Ship Type 2004
(Vessel above 100 GRT)

DWT Average DWT
Type Number DWT (‘000) (‘000)

Oil tanker 22,995 1,857,067 81
Containers Vessel 29,672 1,013,552 34
Ro Ro/Car Carrier 4,454 59,771 13
Bulk Carrier 13,599 772,555 57
Gas Carrier 3,933 138,560 35
General cargo Vessel 14,064 133,560 9
Other 5,038 14,180 3
TOTAL 93,755 3,989,321 43
Source: Japanese Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport survey (Nagamatsu 2006)


The Indonesia’s Sea Lanes

Source: Sloc nusantara, http://www.indo_sloc.com

Figure 9

Economic Resources
43. Food resources. The countries surrounding the IO are inhabited by nearly one quarter of the world's population, yet, according to FAO statistics, only one-twentieth of the world sea-fish production is available to them. The question arises, therefore, whether it is just that the fishery resources of the IO should be used by distant nations to augment the calorie and protein intake of their already well-fed populations. Slightly less than half the present catch of the IO is landed in India. Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka account for about 60% of the remaining catch. It is only recently that the waters beyond the coastal belt began to be exploited. There is a preoccupation with prawn and tuna fisheries because of the expanding foreign markets for these pro­ducts. Very little shipjack tuna is being harvested at present, although the potential is considerable. Sardines, mackerel, and a variety of other fish can be exported in canned of frozen form. Deep sea fish and sardines abound along the west coast of India. The estimate for the potential fish yield of the IO, vary from about 7 million tonnes to 17 million tonnes.[50] Fish production in major fish production countries in 1995 was about 112,910,000 tonnes, which is from the IO was about 10,177,000 tonnes. See Table 6.

44. Energy resources. Today, commercial energy has become the vehicle of development. However, one finds a vast gap in the use of commercial energy in the IOR. The energy use is high either because the state has vast energy resources like oil and gas in the Gulf, Southeast Asia and Australia. Study on energy resources of the IOR reveals four basic sources of commercial energy; coal, oil, gas and hydro power. In 1992, the IOR contribute about 35 % to the global oil production and about 80 % come from the Gulf. IOR has about 68.6 % of global crude oil reserves, of which 95.6 % is located in the Gulf region.[51] IOR contribute 12.7 % to total gas production at the global level, and unlike oil the Gulf region contribute only 44 % of the total natural gas production in the IOR.[52] This region has also large reserve of natural gas amounting to about 35 % of the total world reserves.[53] The Gulf has a share of about 85 % of that reserve in the IOR.[54] See Table-5.

45. Mineral resources. The IO covers an area of 74.92 million sq km with an average depth of 3,897 m and a volume of 291,945 million cubic km.[55] The seafloor of this ocean is covered with wide variety of terrigenous, biogenous and autogenic deposits. See Figure 10. Heavy mineral placers are reported from a number of locations on the beaches of the IO. Placers of ilmenite, zircon and monazite have been reported from the east coast of South Africa; ilmenite, zircon, rutile and monazite from Mozambique and ilmenite, zircon, rutile and magnetite from Tanzania. The beaches of Sri Lanka are well known for the placers of ilmenite, rutile, monazite, zircon and garnet and the reserves have been estimated about 4 millions tones. The beaches of Burma, Malaysia and Indonesia have large placers of tin and this contribute to the world production.

46. The west coast of Australia has large placers deposits of rutile, ilemenite, zircon and monazite. The exploration these deposits to the offshore area have also been carried out and some low grade (0.2-0.22 % of rutile, and zircon) deposits have been estimated to be of the order of 375-500 million tonnes.[56] Manganese nodules cover an area of 10-15 million sq km in the IO. The available data indicate that although nodules occur in most of the basins, paramarginal deposits occur in the Central Indian Basin only. However, additional information may indicate paramarginal resources in some of the regions like the Wharton Basin. The total quantity of nodules present in the IO is estimated to be 0.7 trillion tonnes. The Indian coastline with about 7200 km covers an area of approximately 2.02 million sq km. See Figure 12. Important mineral resources present in the EEZ, and within reach of exploitation, include placers, calcium carbonate and phosphorite deposits.[57] The total estimated reserves of placers deposits are ilmenite (160 million tones), garnet (36.33 million tones), zircon (22 milion tones), rutile (7.8 million tones) and monazite (1.075 million tones).[58]
------
Mineral in the IOR : Sea Floor

Source:http://www.oceansatlas.org/servlet/CDSServlet?status=ND0xNjQwMS4xNjQwMiY2PW
VuJjMzPW1hcHMmMzc9aW5mbw~~[[accessed on 23 July 2008]
Figure 10


IMPLICATION FOR INDONESIA AND SUGGESTED RESPONSE
Historical Perspective
47. From the historical perspective, very less literature exist about naval rivalry in this region. For the few books available, one of the instants was, when the great Chola king Rajaraja-I (AD 985 to 1014) tried to prepare a naval expedition against Sriwijaya Empire, first taking Andaman and Nicobar Islands to serve as an advance base. The Chola fleet sailed on and took several coastal ports. This attack was only to break Sriwijaya's commercial monopoly and not to occupy it permanently. However, the attacked by the Chola to Empire Sriwijaya has resulted in Navies of both countries becoming weak and gave opportunity entry of commerce Arab fleets to South-east Asia and also introduced Islam there. Chinese also arrives in the IO and other countries in that region. Not merely commercial Arab and Chinese fleets, Europe fleets also arrive like British, Dutch, French and Portuguese which fought with each other before sharing the spoils.

48. Even today the US base in Diego Garcia and also deployment of US military force in the IOR, as well as operation of the USCENTCOM in the northwest (Middle-east), USEUCOM in Southwest (Europe and South of Africa) and USPACOM in the northeast and southeast (Asia Pacific) has changed the strategic environment in this region. See Figure 6. On other hand, thus competition between Navy’s of littoral states in the IO will not give anything advantages, and even will weaken conditions in each other’s countries. As a consequence inter-state cooperation in the area possibly will prevent the deployment of foreign fleets in the IO, especially super power countries.

49. Based on these historical experiences, all the littoral states, especially the major power in each sub-region, including India and Indonesia should rethink to build good relationships and strengthening the cooperation between them. The emerging Indian military power at this region without engagement the others littoral states, not only weakens the cooperation and unity between the littoral states, but also the big power can control the all of the regions and even the states. India has a good example for this to against the China presence in this region as well as US concerns. A naval buildup and presence always create tension and suspicion, because the use of naval power is naval strategy, whether applied in peace or war.[59] The IO as a zone of peace is indeed a necessity for the littoral states to promote conducive climate for their national development. Each state should control itself so as not to create tension, or harass its neighbors.

Geo-politics Perspective
50. The IO is home to important SLOCs and maritime choke points. Based on the politician views, on the other hand, SLOCs signify the state of relations with countries located along the sea route traversed, and the other countries that exercise to use this ocean. A large volume of international long haul maritime cargo from the Persian Gulf, Africa and Europe transits through this ocean. Some of the primary items transported are energy products - mainly oil and gas. By its very location, India lies approximately half way between the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. Both these choke points have the potential to become major flash points. There are alternatives to the Strait of Malacca but there are no other routes to transport the Arabian Gulf oil except through pipelines over land, which have their own vulnerabilities. Therefore, any contingency in the Strait of Hormuz has direct implications for the region. By its geographic location, the Indian peninsula ‘dominates’ the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf before they round off south of Dundra Head in Sri Lanka. Further, this SLOC passes close to the Indian islands of Andaman and Nicobar before entering the Malacca Strait.

51. The IO has seen intense maritime activity for the past 600 years, primarily for trade. Centuries ago, the motivation was for silk and spices. Today, it is for oil, the primary energy source powering the economic-industrial sectors of major states which, therefore, becomes the principal strategic determinant. As well as India’s maritime policy to build the strong military power to protect Indian economy growth that dependence on energy, Indian should concern over the IO. For this view, Admiral Mahan said in 1890: “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia…in the 21st Century the destiny of the world would be decided on its waters”.[60] Similarly, in the expansive view of many Indians, India’s security perimeter should extend from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Hormuz and from the coast of Africa to the western shores of Australia. For some Indians, the emphasis is on the northern Indian Ocean, but for others the realm includes even the “Indian Ocean” coast of Antarctica.[61] Sea power or ‘Command of the Sea’ as conceived by Mahan, however, lost its validity in early 20th century due to the sheer pace of technology change. As a result, modern interpretation of ‘Command on the Sea’ has been that of “Sea Control” – a control usually limited both in time and space.[62]

52. Although India stated dominates the SLOCs in this ocean that not mean India can control the SLOCs based on her interest. UNCLOS III codified the oceans as the "Common Heritage of Mankind," to be managed responsibly and equitably for the benefit of all humanity. It was a global agreement, which gives rights not only for littoral states, but also land locked states. UNCLOS III has provided for the change in emphasis from 'Freedom of the Seas' to 'Control and Regulation'. It can be said that due to the ever increasing demands and abuses of the oceans, the international community is obliged to ensure the effective exercise of freedom by controlling and regulating it even more closely. The term ‘control and regulation’ have to be based on the “Common Heritage of Mankind”, which includes to the littoral states in this ocean, and the land locked states. If India tries to deploy strong maritime power to control this ocean, or uses her maritime power to support her economic development, it will impact on all the littoral states and the other countries that use this ocean. The maximum impact will be an Indonesia as the owner of most chokepoint in the IO, such as the Strait of Malacca (Indonesia and Malaysia), Sunda, Lombok, Wetar-Ombai and Torrest (Australia and Indonesia). See Figure 7.

53. US military presence in this ocean has divide the IO as operation of USPACOM in the east, USCENTCOM in Middle East, and USEUCOM in EU and Africa, and can not be neglected. As well as India’s position in the center of IOR, India should not become a dominator but would better become ‘cooperator‘, or, if possible ‘dynamisiator’ among the littoral states in this region. In term of ‘control and regulation’ the ocean, the presence of US military power in this region and another user of SLOCs in this ocean, as well as China and Russia, and the littoral states exercise to use this ocean, as well as in economic, politic and another interest can be achieved. On the other hand, there is needed a good management to ‘control and regulation’ this region, as well as in SLOCs, economy resources, security, environment etc. In term of cooperator or ‘dynamisiator’, position of India in this region is very dominant, but India can not stand alone.

54. There are many political, economic and security regional cooperation mechanism in the region related to the entire the IO as well as ARF, ASEAN, CCG, BIMSTEC, IOR-ARC, NAM, SAARC etc. Nevertheless, each co-operation is still at the dialogue level, and has not been practically implemented as yet. An others security cooperation such as CSI, PSI, SCMI etc. that was formed by the initiative US after the attack of nine 9/11 are not signed by all countries in the region with vary of considerations, especially relates to their national interests. Besides that, most of countries in the region inadequate educational institutions, weak infrastructures, and virtually no technology of them own. India has taken a lead to maintain and improve its multifaceted presence in these countries. On other hand, India should make the IO and its littoral as central to its foreign policy and be ready to play a larger role there for its economic development and to promote prospects of peace and cooperation in the region, as well as politic, economic and security. Besides that, India should change their threat perceptions to the neighbourhood countries and push more to create confidence building measure to them.

Geo-economic Perspective

55. The economic development of a state is closely linked to its trade and energy supply and resource exploration. Since most of the trade of the IO littorals and the South Asian states is seaborne, International Sea Lanes (ISLs) form the lifeline of these countries. In term of ISLs, for an economist it is just the shortest and most economical travel distance between two destinations. From the economic viewpoint, the Malacca Strait is the shortest lanes from Middle East to East Asia, where the littoral states are Indonesia and Malaysia. There are alternative routes to the East Asia through another Indonesian ISL, such as the Sunda and Lombok strait and also the straits of Wetar-Ombai and Torres Strait, where the littoral states are Australia and Indonesia. But, most of super tankers use the Lombok and Makassar Strait to the South China Sea. For this case, to protect the ISLs, as well as the ISLs in the IO, where most of goods and oil were passed through this ocean to East Asia should not be controlled by India alone, but all the littoral states, including Indonesia as the littoral states most of chokepoint must be involved.

56. UNCLOS III extended the EEZ of states to 200 mile, could trigger a classical inter-state maritime conflict, possibly due to sub-regional instabilities in the future. This can be initiated by a seemingly benign show of maritime might for assertion of sovereignty, such as Indonesia’s closure of the Sunda and Lombok Straits in 1996 to demonstrate a resolve so as to enforce interpretation of its archipelagic status. Though the UNCLOS extended the jurisdiction of states over adjoining maritime zones, it fuelled confrontation among neighbours over claim to resources. Moreover, despite efforts to make it comprehensive, it enfolds ambiguities, the varied interpretations of which are potential sources of conflict. Sea mining is the most inexpensive form of maritime warfare and can cripple sea-borne trade particularly at vital choke points. Of course, the economic stakes involved today necessitate security of the ISLs for trade flow and make a full-scale maritime conflict unlikely in the near future. However, the same cannot be asserted for the long term, when the demand for resources may revive such conflicts.

57. The IOR is a very fast growing region in the world economy, and is rapidly becoming a major centre of the world trade and economic activity. Apparently, two ideas have strongly influenced the IOR-ARC. One is the realization that only the IO is not to have any economic grouping like NAFTA, ASEAN and APEC at a time when international relations are increasingly becoming ocean-centric. For these issues, there are three leaders from different countries in this region who gave comments and their hopes. Firstly, Vice-President of India, Mr. K. R. Narayanan said in 1994 at Port Louis: "If the littoral states of the Pacific can draw together in a mutually satisfying convergence of economic and political interests, why not the states on the other side of the developmental divide?[63] Secondly, Prime Minister of Mauritius Dr. Navinchandra Ramgoolam described: "The IOR grouping is a delayed, but timely initiative to enable the Indian Ocean countries to face the challenges of globalization and also utilize the opportunities that it posed”. He warned that unless the developing countries responded suitably and in a spirit of cooperation, they could be marginalized with the emergence of the mega trade bloc.[64] And lastly, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Ali Alatas said in 1997: "The general feeling was that the Atlantic was the Ocean of the past", the Pacific of the present and the Indian Ocean, that of the future. It would be the challenge of the IOR countries to make their Ocean also one of the present"?[65]

58. Implementations of the IOR-ARC agenda, as expressed by the three leaders, implies that need to be done related to the existing natural resources besides as well as huge commercial traffic. Availability of natural resources, as well as food, mineral and energy, will make the IO as the area of mass exploitation in the future. Related to this condition and the claimed to the economy zone by each country, then inter-states conflict cannot be obviated. Meanwhile exploitation of the sea natural resources on a large scale, either through undersea mining, and also fish catch in promiscuously will be ruinous sea environment it self. If this condition happens all countries in the IO will be harmed, particularly Indonesia as the owner of the longest coastline in the region. There have already been many regional and sub-regional organizations within the IOR region existing with some specific agenda. There are broadly five sub-regional organizations, covering the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Rim: GCC; SADC; ASEAN; OAU, AU; SAARC; BIMSTEC; IOR-ARC etc. Although so many regional organizations and the leader expectations exist in the countries of this region as well as explained above to make the IOR as a center of economy development, nevertheless in reality can not be realized. Is needed effort more serious to move forward range from to economy cooperation between the littoral states in the IO, especially by entangles big countries in sub-region like Australia, Indonesia, India, Iran, and South Africa.

59. For instance, economic cooperation between the IO littoral states, especially in trades shown by the Indian government. After 1991, the Indian government introduced a series of reforms to liberalize and globalize the foreign trade. Its exports have grown from Rs. 32,558 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 2,91,582 crore in 2003-04 and imports from Rs. 43,193 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 3,53,976 crore in 2003-04.[66] India has emphasized to develop close trade relations with the countries of the IOR. The major commodities India exports include textiles, chemicals and related products, engineering goods, gems and jewelers, petroleum products, agricultural products, etc.[67] Indian exports (by value in crore rupees) to the countries of Indian Ocean are shown in Table 7. The exports from India indicate that their nature and quantum has diversified. Almost nil at the time of independence, about one ­third of India's exports are now directed towards the countries of the region. Significantly, India exports its goods to all the countries and island states of the region. Major import commodities to India include petroleum, which also constitute electronic goods, gold, machinery and metal ores and scraps. From Saudi Arabia, emanate 7.62% of Indian imports and 4.68% from the UAE.[68] Import and export (by value in crore rupees) from India to the countries of the region is shown in Table 7 and 8 still in small portion. These figure should be followed by more aggressive and progression among the countries in this region to promoting the trade between them.

Table 7 : Value of Exports from India to the Countries of the IOR

Source: System of Foreign Trade Analysis, Dept. of Commerce, Govt. of India.
See also www.commerce.nic.in/lndia_trade.htm.

Table 8 : Value of Imports to India from the countries of the IOR

Source: System of Foreign Trade Analysis, Dept. of Commerce, Govt. of India.
See also www.commerce.nic.in/ftpa/comq.asp.

Security Perspective

60. While the best approach to ISL security obviously lies in extensive cooperation, the fact is that ISLs arouse different response strategies amongst different people and countries. To a military analyst, the ISLs are related to the maritime instruments of power, and maritime geography becomes the pivot on which forces must be deployed. Similarly, for some nations multilateral cooperation on ISL security may mean a perceived intrusion into aspects of sovereignty. Thus the security of sea lanes requires comprehensive strategies encompassing differing perceptions and national interests of concerned states. For India’s interest was very clearly, ‘to become economic super power, India should become a strong military power, as well as maritime power to deploy in the IO to protect its economic interests’. In another case, the relevant GOM section says: “India has a vital interest in the security and stability of its SLOC in the IO; our energy security is closely linked to maritime security”.[69]

61. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee made the following statement on India’s strategic priorities during the Combined Commanders’ Conference in November 2003: …the strategic frontiers of today’s India, grown in international stature, have expanded well beyond confines of South Asia…Our security environment ranges from Persian Gulf to Straits of Malacca across the Indian Ocean, includes Central Asia and Afghanistan, China…and South-East Asia. Our strategic thinking has also to extend to these horizons.[70] And also, Indian Naval officials have been frequently endorsing publicly this views and such statement attribute to the Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta is: “Our area operation is not just restricted to the Indian Ocean; we are also engaged in security energy lines and sea lanes of communication.”[71] As well as explained above, that A naval buildup and a naval presence always create tension and suspicion, because the use of naval power is naval strategy, whether applied in peace or war. So, in the future India should strengthening the military cooperation between the countries in the IO to ensure the confidence building measure and deter or minimize outsider from entering this region.

62. In another hand, strategic environment in IOR has been reconfigured since the end of the Cold War the region has now become a NATO lake dominated by US-led coalition from among NATO members and its non-NATO allies like Australia, Japan, South Korea, etc. The presence of the US military force as well as zone operation of the USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, and USPACOM had changed the strategic environment in the IOR. However, there are drawbacks for India to aligning too closely with either power. Washington has often touted the "natural alliance" between the two expansive, multi-ethnic democracies, but it is on military issues that India would most like to develop its relationship with the U.S. During the recent tsunami relief effort, the two states' navies worked together, which helped to cement their budding military-to-military ties. The U.S. would like the Indian navy to serve as a bulwark against China as Beijing becomes more active in this ocean. Also, there are some areas where the U.S. Navy cannot operate, such as the Malacca Straits, where India's presence might be seen as less threatening than that of the US, especially near Andaman and Nicobar Islands. But, the consequences of the presence of NATO and its aliened in this ocean will attract the insurgencies and terrorist activities with maritime traditions abound in the latter sub-region, viz. the groups ‘jihadi’ global terrorist, such as JI and al-Qaeda from Muslim Countries, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front of the Abu Say’yaf from South Philippine, and the LTTE’s in Sri Lanka.

63. Certainly, the strategic importance of the South China Sea cannot be overlooked for whoever controls this region it may also exert control over five important chokepoints in the region, namely Malacca Straits, Sunda Straits, the Straits of Lombok and Makassar, Ombai-Wetar Straits, and Torres Straits. See Figure 7. All are vital to the world economy as John H. Noer and David Gregory stated that: “... over half of the world’s merchant fleet capacity - more than one third of the world’s ships - sailed through the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, or Lombok, or sailed past the Spratly Islands. This volume of shipping sailing on the South China Sea gives the region its global significance”[72]. Any disruption to these important sea lanes will, no doubt, force the USA to engage itself militarily in preventing it from being so. John H. Noer asserted that: “The US Navy will always carry out its traditional mission of protecting freedom of the seas. During the Cold War, protecting economic SLOCs was subordinate to protecting military SLOCs. As the Cold War mind-set recedes, the naval mission of protecting shipping could emerge as an explicit national priority”[73].

64. The security of the transport corridors is a big concern to China, chiefly in the Strait of Malacca, through which all Middle Eastern oil reaches China and the other Northeast Asian customers. Beijing has stated that oil supply routes are one of its strategic interests and would use naval force to control these critical shipping lanes. Hu Jintao, President of the People’s Republic of China commented that the “Malacca dilemma” is a key element to China’s energy security. President Hu stated, "Certain powers (the United States) have all along encroached on and tried to control the navigation through the strait." A Chinese military expert recommended China to pursue both offensive and defensive naval strategies by building up massive warships and submarines to challenge the domination of the United States forces on the high seas. Offensive military option is to deploy rapid reaction forces when a crisis occurs while defensive posture is by creating credible deterrence capability. Both strategies will show China’s determination and strength to safeguard the country’s interests.[74]

65. Relation between India and US, the world largest and strongest democracies, had warmed since the down of the 21st century and had been working closely to seek a partnership of shared endeavor. As the Ambassador of the United States to India Richard F. Celeste remarked "If I were to characterize the progress we've made in our bilateral relations ... I would say that we've moved from paranoia to partnership." "Globalization is erasing boundaries and building networks between nations and people, economies and cultures. The world is increasingly coming together around the democratic ideals India and the United States have long championed and lived by.... We will seek to narrow our differences and increase mutual understanding on non-proliferation and security issues. This will help us to realize the full potential of Indo-U.S. relations and contribute significantly to regional and global security." --- Joint India - U.S. Statement (Indian Embassy - Washington DC).[75] The close relation both of countries, India and US especially in security matters, in one side will deter the China presence in this region. In another hand will increase the perception among the countries in the region, that India will become the US’s policeman in the region.

66. The India’s nuclear policy ‘no-first use” may be right in term of strategic deterrence, where both of countries like China and Pakistan are nuclear powers. The Indian Ocean, owing to its geo-strategic disposition, will continue to enjoy eminence in global calculations. Driven by the demand for key resources and markets, the jostling among regional and extra-regional maritime powers for influence in the region will remain. However, the altered complexion of security threats necessitates that states seek convergence to preserve the freedom of navigation. Though military pacts may now seem redundant, multilateralism has acquired a fresh relevance in the form of security arrangements. Regional cooperation would also be fruitful to reduce inter-state tensions since it would be preceded by trust building; and naturally succeeded by creating common stakes in the maintenance of peace and stability in this region. For this situation, all the littoral states will get advantages when the peaceful climate is formed in this region, including Indonesia as a country that has her national security policy based on the external security environment.

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

67. The IO needs a secure maritime environment to achieve sustained development. India has a stable political system and a liberal-democratic polity. A burgeoning economy, technologically advanced in many areas, strong in maritime, land and air forces, with a large number of educational institutions and largest technical manpower in the region, India stands out as one of the leading countries of the region. From India's broad interaction with the IO and its littoral states, it can be easily inferred that the IOR is its rightful domain which extends from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Hormuz and from the coast of Africa to the western shores of Australia.

68. On the other hand, most of the countries of its littoral have inadequate educational institutions, weak infrastructure, and virtually no technology of their own. India has taken a lead to maintain and improve its multifaceted presence in these countries, but a lot needs to be done. That is possible only if India makes the IO and its littoral as central to its foreign policy and be ready to play a larger role there for its economic development and to promote prospects of peace and cooperation in the region, as well as politic, economic and security. India should change the threat perception to the neighbourhood countries and push more to create confidence building measure to them.

Recommendations

69. Based on the pact, discussion and conclusion above, in order to create politic, economy and security stability in the IOR, the following is recommended;
(a) ISL management
(b) Exploration resources management
(c) Littoral state conflict management
(d) Maritime security management
And India should become the centre of gravity the cooperation between the littoral states in the IOR, together with major power in the sub-region as well as Australia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, because of the geo-strategic position of India in the region, as well as the stability of politic, emerging economy power and huge infra structures.

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Total Number of Words: 12,750
(Excluding tables and figures)

[1] Sharma, R.C, and P.C. Sinha, India’s Ocean Policy, Khama Publishers, New Delhi, 1994, p.25
[2] Das, P.S., "Indian Ocean Region in India's Security Calculus", Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, Vol.9 No.3, Dec 2001. p. 316
[3] Soekmono, R., Pengantar Sejarah Kebudayaan Indonesia (Introduction to Cultural History of Indonesia), Kanisius Press, Jogyakarta, 1985, p. 35.
[4] SarDesai, D.R, Southeast Asia Past & Present, Westview Press, San Francisco, 1994 p. 42
[5] Ibid, p.54
[6] Indonesia 2008, An Official Handbook, Department of Information, Jakarta, 2008, p.26
[7] Awati, M.P, Vice Admiral, Maritime India, Traditions and Travails, in Nayyar, KK, Vice Admiral, ed. Maritime India, New Delhi, 2005, p.27
[8] Ibid
[9] Wahyono, S.K, Strategic Assessment of The Indian Ocean: An Indonesia View, in Robert H. Bruce, ed. Indian Ocean Navies Technological Advance and Regional Security, Study in Indian Ocean Maritime Affairs, Number 4, 1990, p. 126
[10] Bhupender Singh, Indian Ocean and Regional Security, Patiala, 1983, p.7
[11] Ibid
[12] Ibid
[13] Ibid, p.8
[14] Bhupinder Singh, op.cit, n.9, p.9-10.
[15] Rupert Emerson, The Rise of Self Assertion of Asian and African People, Cambridge, 1960, p.40.
[16] Singh, KR, Indian Ocean Great Power Interventions Vol. I, New Delhi, 2006, p. 29
[17] Ibid, p.30
[18] Ibid, p.32
[19] Ibid, p.44
[20] Ibid , p.48
[21] Sushila Narsimhan, India's 'Look East' Policy: Past, present and Future, in K. Raja Reddy, ed. India and ASEAN: Foreign Policy Dimensions for the 21st Century, New Delhi 2005, p.32.
[22] Tridip Chakraborti, ‘’Disparate Prioroties : Explaining the Penumbra of India’s Look East Policy’’, in K. Raja Reddy, ed. India and ASEAN : Foreign Policy Dimensions for the 21st Century, New Delhi, 2005,p.54
[23] Gurmeet Kanwal, Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal, New Delhi, 2001, p. 83
[24] Jasjit Singh, AVSN, VrC, VM, Air Commodore (Retd) Nuclear India, New Delhi, 1998, p.314
[25] Naidu, G.V.C., Indian Navy and South East Asia, New Delhi, 2000, p.71
[26] Bansal, N.K, Mathur, Jyotirmay and Wagner, H. J, Energy Security, Climate Change and Sustainable Development, New Delhi, 2007, pp.3-4
[27] Ibid
[28] Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 13, January 1991, p.54.
[29] Ibid
[30] Naidu, op.cit, no. 24, p.19
[31] “Botha, P.J (Head: Asia Pacific Business, ABSA Bank), Security and Co-operation in the Indian Ocean Rim, Monograph No.9, Diplomats and Defenders, 1997. http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Momograph/Np.9/Botha; htlm# Anchor-54363. [[accessed on 5 June 2008]
[32] Ibid
[33] Mihir, Vice Admiral K. Roy, South Asia after the Cold War, Colorado, 1993, p. 239
[34] Ministry of Defense (MoD), Annual Report 2005-2006, New Delhi, 2006, p.2
[35] Russell Skelton, Jakarta Shipping Plan Sparks Anger; Passage Limits Raise Nations’ Ire, Sydney Morning Herald, June 5, 1996.
[36] Andrew Holt, Plugging the Holes in Maritime Security, Terrorism Monitor, May 6, 2004, 2 (9).
[37] Singh, K.R., “Maritime Violence and Non-state Actors”, Dialogue, Apr-Jun 2003, 4 (4) at http://www.asthabharati.org/ Dia_Apr03/krs.htm. [[accessed on 31 May 2008]
[38] http://idun.its.adfa.edu.au /ADSC/Sloc/SlocRoy.htm [[accessed on 30 April 2008]
[39] http://wwww.wikipedia.com/ [[accessed on 22 June 2008]
[40] Ibid
[41] Ibid
[42] Donna J. Nincic, Sea Lanes Security and US Maritime Trade: Chokepoint as Scare Resources, in Sam J. Tangredi, ed. Globalization and Maritime Power, Washington DC, 2002, pp. 148-149
[43] Hamza, B. A, and Mohd. Nizam Basiron, The Strait of Malacca: Some Funding Proposals, MIMA Paper, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, p.67
[44] Anwar, Dewi Fortuna, Indonesia and the Security of Southeast Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta,1992, p.64
[45] Ibid
[46] Ibid
[47] Ibid
[48] Ibid
[49] Ibid
[50] Qasim, Z.S., The Ocean : The Future Hope of Mankind, in Satish Chandra, B. Arunachalam, V Suryanarayan ed. The Indian Ocean and Its Islands Strategic, Scientific, and Historical Perspectives, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1993 p.32
[51] Singh, K.R, The Making of an Indian Ocean Community, Fifth Indira Gandhi Conference, New Delhi, 1996, p.24
[52] Ibid
[53] Ibid
[54] Ibid
[55] Qasim, Dr. S.Z., Marine Mineral and Mining Policy in the Indian Ocean, ed. The Making of an Indian Ocean Community, New Delhi, 1997 p. 114
[56] Brown, G.A, Offshore Mineral Exploration in Australia, 1971, pp.166-175
[57] Qasim, op cit. , no. 50 p. 117
[58] Gujar, A.R. Nagendernath, and Banerjee, R., Marine Mineral: The Indian Perspective, Marine Mining, 1988, pp. 317-350
[59] Mahan, Alfred Thayer, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, Boston: Little, Brown, 1890; repr. New York: Dover, 1987, p.5
[60] Ibid. p.71
[61] India has a long-standing involvement in Antarctica. In December 2004, for example, New Delhi announced it was planning to set up its third research station there. See “India to Set Up Third Station in Antarctica,” India News, 16 December 2004, available at http://www.newkerala.com/. [[accessed 21 June 2008]
[62] Manod Gupta, Maritime Affairs Integrated Management for India, New Delhi, 2005. p. 36
[63] Patriot, 17 May 1994.
[64] Hindu, 6 March 1997.
[65] Ibid
[66] http://www.commerce.nic.in/ftpa/comq.asp. See, commerce. nic. in/ indtrade.htm. [[accessed 18 Juli 2008]
[67] Ibid
[68] Ibid
[69] Chaudhury, R.R, “India and Emerging Geopolitics of Indian Ocean Region”, Journal of India Ocean Study, Vol. 11, no.3, December 2003, p. 407
[70] Kapila, Subhas, India Defines Her Strategic Frontiers. SAAG Paper No. 832, November 4, 2003.
[71] See, “Naval Chief allays fears of radiation,” The Hindu, July 7, 2007.
[72] Noer, John H., David Gregory, Chokepoints Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, Washington, DC, 1996, p.3.
[73] Ibid p.6
[74] Charles R. Smith, “France-China Stage Joint Navy Games, Sino-French War Games Prelude to Euro Arms Sales”, Mar. 18, 2004. The article is on the World Wide Web at
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/3/18/82202.shtml [[ccessed on 18 September 2004]
[75] Deep K. Railya, “India-US Relation in 21st Century, The article is on the World Wide Web at http://ess.idrf.org/esms/Essay%20Attachment/%20Essay-2003129075002 [accessed on 25 April 2008]

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